Who gets what and why by Alvin E Roth
(Nobel prize winner in economics)
Matching is economist-speak for how we get the many things we
choose in life that also must choose us. Until recently, economists often
passed quickly over matching and focused primarily on commodity markets, in
which prices alone determine who gets what. But, in matching markets, prices
don’t work that way. For example, going to college can be costly and not
everyone can afford it and even if it is affordable for some, the choice is not
mainly with price alone.
Decisions that depend on what others are doing are called
strategic decisions and are the concern of the branch of economics called game
theory. Strategic decision making plays a big role in determining who does well
or badly in many selection process. Often when we game theorists study a
matching process, we learn how participants ‘game the system’ Well-designed
matching process try to take into account the fact that participants are making
strategic decisions. A good marketplace makes participation safe and
simple. .
Repugnant transactions - transaction that some people don’t want
others to engage in- don’t have to involve money. But addition of money makes
an otherwise acceptable transaction seem repugnant. Repugnance shows with
particular clarity what all markets reveal: people’s values, desires and
beliefs.
In the late 1800s, the economist William Stanley Jevons pointed
out that the invention of money was a market design solution that overcame a
major problem that severely limited barter, namely the need to find someone who
both has what you want and wants what you have. Money eases the need to find
this ‘double coincidence:’ with money in the market, it’s enough to find
someone who has what you want. You can buy what you want from that person
without having to find someone with whom you can trade goods.
In building up new markets, the entrepreneurs building them have
had to figure out the following:
- How to make the market thick by attracting lots of buyers and sellers
- How to overcome the potential congestion that could result - that is, how to make the market quick even when it was thick:
- How to make the market safe and trustworthy
Making market safe is one of the oldest problems of market design,
going back to well before the invention of agriculture, when hunters traded the
ax heads and arrowheads that archaeologists today find thousands of miles from
where they were made.
When participants in a market are reluctant to reveal crucial
information, the market may run inefficiently. On eBay, concealing bid
information from other bidders by sniping makes prices unpredictable and when
there a lot of sniping, not every auction is won by the person who is willing
to pay the most. Covisint was started in 2000 by a consortium of the
biggest car companies. It was intended to be a transparent online marketplace
for automobile makers and their suppliers. But it turned out that auto parts
suppliers weren’t wild about making their prices public to auto companies and
competitors. In 2004, the automakers threw in the towel and sold Covisint for a
tiny fraction of what they’d invested in it.
Marketplaces as varied as eBay, FreeMarkets and the New York City
Public school system reveal a challenge that must be faced by virtually all
markets: how to manage the flow of information. No matter how well a market is
otherwise designed, it will have trouble giving people what they want if it
doesn’t make it safe for them to try to get what they want.
The solutions to problems in market design are sometime invented,
sometimes discovered, and often a bit of both. The designs for many markets
have evolved, usually through trial and error, over the long span of human
history. So we can sometimes discover a solution to a new market failure in a
design pioneered in another market.
Markets can be dramatically improved when their design encourages
people to communicate essential information they might otherwise have kept to
themselves. But sometimes markets suffer from too much communication. It is a
paradox of market design that as communication gets easier and cheaper, it
sometimes also gets less informative.
In a congested market - one in which it is impossible to explore
every opportunity - it helps to be able to signal not only how desirable you
are but also how interested. That is why, while many of us might wish to marry
a movie star, we devote most of our efforts to finding and courting more
realistic mates who might also like to marry us (Mutual interest is what
separates courting couples from stalker and prey).
Asking a person out on a date in person offers lots of
opportunities to send both kinds of signals. By comparison, arranging a date on
the internet, which makes the dating market thicker by making initial contacts
easier, also makes it harder to send credible signals to cut through the
congestion.
When other signals may be cheap talks (sending e-greeting cards),
these signals (posting a physical card, sending flowers on birthday, etc.)
indicate that you are interested enough to use scarce resources that you can’t
just send to everyone. So a scarce signal isn’t cheap talk; it comes with an
opportunity cost - you could have sent that signal to someone else instead. In
labor market, a cover letter in a job application can provide a powerful signal
of interest, esp. if it shows that the candidate has spent time to learn about
the job for which he or she is applying, or even that the applicant has spent
time carefully crafting a letter addresses specifically to the job in question.
Near the beginning of his long essay ‘The Protestant Ethic and the
spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber quotes Benjamin Franklin on the virtues of
responsible lending and borrowing. Franklin’s view was the opposite of
Polonius's: he felt that responsible borrowing and lending were Puritan virtues
and he offered advice about how to use credit responsibly.
Economists have long been accustomed to the fact that cash
payments can fill such gaps by providing incentives to increase supply: Adam
Smith, in his book ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations’, famously observed, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the banker, that we respect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest”.
The markets we try to ban, repugnant markets, are precisely that
some people willingly take part in despite other’ opposition. People wanting to
transact with one another is a powerful force. The same force that has made
markets an ancient and pervasive human activity also leads to black markets
springing up when legal ones are prevented. America's Prohibition period shows,
sometimes banning a market leads to widespread lawbreaking. Let us consider one
other example in which repugnant transactions are common: sex. People want to
have sex with each other in circumstances that society disapproves of.Instead
of a ban, we will more nearly achieve our goals if we try to channel behavior
or offer alternatives (for this reason, we sometimes try to promote ‘safe sex’
rather than abstinence). In short, when we deal with sex, we need to recognize
that we are dealing with powerful attractions. Markets are like that, too.
We encounter markets through marketplaces, just as we experience
language through speeches, conversations, books, essays and tweets. And market
are like languages. Both are ancient human inventions. Both are tools we use to
organize ourselves, to cooperate and coordinate and compete with one another,
and ultimately to figure out who gets what. These two fundamental human
artifacts play a role in all the things we do and in everything we make (we
cannot make love, let alone war, without them).
Markets, like languages, come in many varieties. Commodity markets
are impersonal, but matching markets can be deeply personal, as personal as a
job offer or a marriage proposal. And once you observe that matching is one of
the major things that markets do, you realize that matching markets - markets
in which prices don’t do all the work, and in which you care about whom you
deal with - are everywhere and at many of the most important junctures of our
lives.
As we start to understand better how markets and marketplaces
work, we realize that we can intervene in them, redesign them, fix them when
they are broker and start new ones where they will be useful. The growing
ability in recent years of economists to be engineers is a bit like the epochal
transformation that farming or medicine have experienced over the millennia.
Markets are human artifacts, not natural phenomena. Markets design gives us a
chance to maintain and improve some of humanity’s more ancient essential
inventions.