Balance - by Glenn Hubbard and Tim Kane
The economics of great powers from ancient Rome
to Modern America
[Authors were members of Mitt Romney economic advisers. It includes 8 case studies of Great Power imbalance - Rome, Ottoman,
Spanish, British, Japan, European Union, & California)]
Recent research by Harvard economists Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff suggests that countries with a total debt to gross
domestic product (GDP) ratio that exceeds 90 percent face a tipping point of
decline. And the US, with annual deficits that now amount to 5-10 % of annual
GDP and a debt-to-GDP ratio of around 70%, is rapidly heading toward a critical
level of imbalance.
Some sports, notably soccer and baseball, tend
to be conservative, allowing few rule changes. In contrast, American football
and basketball have been much more open to revising their rules. The evolution
of play in those games has made them popular - and economically successful.
Presidents and legislators often know good
policy from bad, but their incentives are short-term reelection rather than
long-term national growth, a specific problem for representative democracies.
When nations agree to open their borders with ‘free’ trade agreements by
lowering tariffs, many industries lobby for non-tariff barriers (for
restriction on imported beef in Japan or modified crops from Europe). Even
though economists since Adam Smith haven argued that mercantilism is
unproductive, the lure of managed trade is siren song during election season.
The policy may be irrational economically while perfectly rational politically.
The lowest recent level of US debt held by the public
relative to the size of the economy was 23.9% of GDP in 1974, which in real
dollars was $344 bn. Today, the level is around 75% of GDP or $11,578bn (this
figure does not include debt held in govt. accounts). By contrast, the European
Central Bank reports that 2010 debt among member countries ranged from 119 % of
GDP in Italy to 143 % in Greece and 6.6% in Estonia. Interest payment on higher
debt level is a major expenditure category that crowds out normal government
functions if interest rates rise.
Roman might have fallen one, three or five
centuries before it ultimately did. That lesson should not be lost on modern
nations. Sweden showed the way large European welfare states can succeed with
reforms. By contrast, Greece today seems determined to show how reform can
fail. What has been lingering in Japan for 2 decades, haunting Europe in recent
years and now loose in the US is the beginning, not the end of a global fiscal
reform.
“Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power - Adam
Smith”
“In Europe and America, there’s growing feeling
of hysteria....
We share the same biology, regardless of
ideology - Sting, “Russians”
Daniel Kahneman (Nobel literate, 2011) says, The
humans described by prospect theory are guided by the immediate emotional
impact of gains and losses. His three summary points of the prospect theory are
paraphrased here:
1. People have reference points. Outcomes better
than the reference points are gains, while those worse than the reference
points are losses
2. Behavior follows a principle of diminishing
sensitivity. We think in terms of relative and not absolute values. As our
reference endowment increases (that is, as we move from $100 to $1,000,000),
the prospect of losing or gaining another $100 diminishes in importance
3. People have loss aversion. Equivalent losses
loom larger than gains.
The application of prospect theory to Great
Power behavior is this: a collective sense of loss aversion makes countries
hesitant to change their economies, even when they see trading partners and
perceived competitor nations growing and changing.
Research by economists on institutions has aimed
at the following questions: Why did the industrial revolution begin there and
then, and not 1650 or even around the year 50, about the time Hero of Alexandria
had developed a steam engine? And why England and not in China or the Roman
Empire, states brimming with technical genius? Why did Hero’s contemporaries
not use steam engine to power instruments of production, instead of using them
to wow tourists with magical toy?
Again, from economists: institutions. The
economic revolution finally happened in England, in about 1750, because of
institutions. As a consequence of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the British
government was able to commit to upholding private rights, protecting wealth,
and eliminating arbitrary increase in taxes. These institutional changes gave
entrepreneurs the incentives to make investments necessary to make the most
technological inventions - the spinning jenny and the water frame, for example.
Though a sophisticated economy at the same time, China, by contrast, lacked the
intentions to allow entrepreneurship to flourish.
Economist Anne Krueger coined the term in
describing the behavior of the third-world bureaucrats who were technically
corrupt - selling business licenses to applicants who preferred to skip the
regulatory waiting period. The existence of long waiting periods for licenses
is usually a sign of rent-seeking. In modern economies, special interests often
seek rents in the tax code by lobbying legislators. Monopolistic firms are
natural rent-seekers, as are labor unions and guilds that expend their
resources to limit competition.
This line of inquiry recognizes that explaining
the emergence of growth requires a theory as to why some nations prosper while
others fail to do so. Institutional explanations have centered on historical
foundations - such as the rule of law, an independent judiciary and property
rights.
Perhaps the way to think about this paradox is
that there is no perfect set of economic rules that guarantee growth. The rules
of capitalism circa 1820 were great for promoting growth in 1820, but were
insufficient for 1920 industrial capitalism and certainly for 2020 techno
capitalism.
Every decade that a Great Power can maintain
balance is a triumph because the pressures to fall are natural, powerful and
constant. Here are the key factors to watch for:
Bounded rationality means rulers are limited in
their ability to choose the ideal economic policies.
National identity makes for strong cultural,
political, and economic institutions, which are essential for growth and power,
but that strength also implies conservatism in the sense of resistance to structural
change.
With loss aversion, leaders rarely innovate,
since they are averse to losing their status as leaders
Time preference matters too. Even when officials
are cognizant of the need for reform, they defer necessary changes for another
day or year,. Voters too, habitually discount the future value of higher prosperity
tomorrow and avoid making painful choices in the present.
“The mind of the superior man dwells on
righteousness; the mind of a little man dwells on profit - Confucius,
Analects”.
“The Egyptians had a great secret, which they
did not forget for thirty centuries. They feared and hated change, and they
avoided it wherever possible - Charges Van Doren, The History of Knowledge”.
“Gold is the corpse of value,” says Goto
Dengo....”The General didn’t care about gold. He understood that the real gold
is here,” he points to his head, “in the intelligence of the people, and here,”
he holds out his hands, “in the work that they do. Getting rid of our gold was
the best thing that ever happened to Nippon. It made us rich” - Neal
Stephenson, Cryptonomicon.
Following our tour of Great Power history, here
then are seven lessons we draw:
1. Nothing is inevitable. At any moment in time,
no great power is destined to succeed or to fail. Long-lived states such as
Rome or Ottoman Turkey did not appreciate the reality of their demise.
2. People are people. There was never such thing
as ‘Jewish physics’. That is, however, how many nationalist Germans in the
early 20th century characterized the research of their country man Albert
Einstein. In the same vein, we are typical or economists who reject the idea of
ethnic economics. Supply & demand curves operate the same way in Beijing,
Munich, Boston and Mumbai. Growth will accelerate in any country that
establishes superior institutions with incentives for commerce,
entrepreneurship, and technological change.
3. The existential threat is internal. In every
case study, we saw Great Powers decline internally centuries before external
threats toppled them.
4. Ignorance if the ultimate bind. Time and
again, Great Powers decline because their wise and brave rulers do not know
something essential about their economy. However, as we observed throughout our
text, nobody else alive knew it, either.
5. Governments are the most dangerous ‘faction’.
Every country has a diverse population, though outside observers often miss
this fact, as they are prone to generalizations. Even supposedly homogenous
ethnic nations such as Japan, Israel or Nigeria have, in reality sharp internal
divisions. The task of a well-run democracy is to balance the interests of
these inevitable factions, an outcome aided by freedom of expression. When the
people who control the levers of government are able to enrich themselves at taxpayers’
expense, and when such centralized rent-seeking is unchecked, the situation can
deteriorate toward fiscal ruin.
6. Loss aversion threatens innovations. In most
cases of imperial decline, there was some faction that controlled the
government and insisted on preservation of the status quo. When such a
faction, like the Janissaries, for example, inserts itself into the economy,
tolerance for economic innovation disappears. Because innovation routinely
threatens traditional production methods (and profits), resistance to economic
innovation is common among all growing economics, as for example, with 19th
century Luddites’ resistance to the substitution of mechanical devices for
artisans’ labor or contemporary resistance of some office workers to
information technologies that substitute for them.
7. Under-stretch is a greater threat than over-stretch.
Finally, as we reflect back of Paul Kennedy’s book ‘The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers’ and his argument that ‘imperial overstretch’ led to imperial
decline, it seems clear that the economic history of Great Powers does not
support that thesis. The data collected and assembled in the quarter century
since then provide more evidence to the contrary.
Here are four modifications that will enhance
the traditional text, improve its odds of becoming law, and just may be preempt
the coming fiscal crisis:
1. The annual constraint on expenditure should
be defined by the median federal inflation-adjusted revenues of the previous
seven years, not the current year.
2. Any amendment should be simple, focused only
to fiscal balance
3. Any new rule or balanced budget amendment
should use escalating super-majorities for exemptions that are universal.
4. The balanced budget act should provide a
glide path to a lower debt-to-GDP ratio.